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TRANSFERRING TITLE TO LAND BY DEED.
JAMES W. SIMONTON *
The early common law method of conveying possessory
freehold interests in land was by a ceremony called feoff-
ment' wiich symbolized the delivery of the seisin of the land
by the feoffor to the feoffee2 In time it became the custom
to make a sealed document called a charter of feoffment, in
order to have better evidence of what had occurred, but
execution and delivery of the charter of feoffment was not
the conveyance and did not pass title, but the charter was
only evidence and as evidence it was not even regarded as
conclusive, though as a practical matter it probably was
conclusive.3
After the passage of the Statute of Uses in 1536 convey-
ances dependent wholly or in part on this Statute superseded
feoffment. Some of these new conveyances could be made
orally, but in due time, legislation was passed which made a
deed essential. As conveyances now were by deed instead
of by feoffment, and the title necessarily passed at some
time during the process of making and delivering the deed,
it came to be settled that the time of passing of title was at
the time of the delivery of the deed.4 In early continental
law the manual transfer of a written conveyance of land was
looked upon as the symbolical transfer of the land,' but
• Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
"F eoffment is a species of the genus gift," II POLLOCK AND MAITLAND,
HISTORY OF THE ElNGLISH LAW, 82.
2 For an account of the ceremony and its effect see III HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW, 221 et seq. Also see III POLLOCK AND
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW, 82-86.
3 9 HoLDswoRTH, HisrtorY OF THE ENGLISH LAW, 164.
4 "A deed takes effect only from this tradition or delivery; for if the date
be false or impossible the delivery ascertains the time of it. And if an-
other party seals the deed, yet if the party delivers it himself, he thereby
adopts the sealing, and by a parity of reasoning the signing also, and makes
them both his own. B. ." II ILACKSTONE, 306-7. See also CHESHIRE,
REAL PROPERTY, 595.
5 This was probably due to the influence of the Roman law where means
of making conveyances in fact in this way had been found though the
theory differed. Hence as Pollock and Maitland state "It was a world in
which ownership was apparently being transferred by documents that the
barbarians invaded." (Vol. II, p. 89). It is very easy where the charter
of feoffment bad become important, to pass to modes of conveying land
wherein the document passed the title.
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here the instrument, unlike the charter of feoffment, was an
essential part of the conveyance. The handing over of this
essential writing was regarded as a ceremony passing the
title. This idea that the manual transfer of the document
was the effective act, was adopted into the English law not
only as to deeds of grant, but as to all sealed instruments
and even as to promissory notes and unsealed written con-
tracts.' Hence as to a deed the delivery became the final
act essential to its operation as a conveyance. Before de-
livery the alleged deed was merely written words on paper
-after delivery the deed was evidence of the conveyance or
passing of the title, but the actual transfer of the title rights
to the land occurred at the point where delivery of the deed
became complete.'
Since title passes at the instant of completed delivery, what
is it that then occurs? Judges and lawyers have too often
looked upon title as a thing (incorporeal it is true) which is
capable of being passed from hand to hand,' and which the
fee simple owner may transfer as a whole, or may split from
it one or many pieces and transfer the pieces to different
individuals. This tendency to look upon title as a thing has
had its effect in producing technical doctrines some of which
have persisted, though they should have disappeared long
ago. Title is not a thing, but a relation which the person
we call owner, bears to the land owned. If A has a fee
simple in Blackacre, this means that A bears a relation to
Blackacre which the courts will recognize and protect, which
gives A the group of rights, powers, privileges and immunities
which make up normal fee simple ownership.' A may make
any use of the land the law does not forbid; A may transfer
all or part of his relation to others in the manner provided
by law; A may exclude others from the land to the fullest
6 See T=Aiy, REAL PaoPERTY, 2d ed. 1737-9.
7CHALus, REAL PSoPEaTY, 3rd ed. 107; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2nd ed.
1738.
8 It seems very difficult to get away from such reasoning. There is much
technical reasoning in the cases really based on the assumption title is a
thing. The effect of such reasoning on the covenant of warranty is dis-
cussed in 29 W. Va. L. QuAR. 265-8.
9 See Bigelow, "Natural Easements," 9 Imi 1. REv. 541.
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extent the law allows; all this the courts will recognize and
protect if A so desires. Whenever one has possession of a
tract of land and the law will not permit any one to oust
him now or in the future then one has fee simple ownership.
This sort of ownership is acquired by adverse holding for
the period set in the statute of limitations. The fee simple
relation to certain land once acquired cannot be lost by
abandonment, but may pass from the owner only by reason
of a conveyance in legal form, or by reason of the running
of the statute of limitations, or in some other manner pro-
vided by law. The relation once acquired may be trans-
ferred to another by a deed properly executed and duly de-
livered. 1 By this means A may place B in AKs place in
relation to Blackacre. B thus will acquire the relation-
rights toward the land which A had. In this transfer the de-
livery of the deed is the effective act.
What constitutes a legal delivery of the deed? Since the
delivery of the deed was once looked upon as a ceremony pass-
ing the title, it is probable that the manual handing over
of the instrument to the grantee or to his agent was once
essential, but if so that has long since been abandoned,
though it may have left in its wake some little technical
peculiarities which still trouble us. But such manual de-
livery presupposes the physical presence of the grantee or
of his agent at the place of delivery and perhaps also an
acceptance of the deed by the grantee. If the grantee or his
agent be present, the delivery and the acceptance will coin-
cide. It is only when we concede the grantor may deliver
a deed though the grantee is not present, that the question
whether acceptance is essential arises. The necessity of an
to If A has possession of Blackaere and no one can bring suit or enter
under a better right, then it is clear that A has fee simple title. There
is no magic about title. If courts will protect A's possession fully that
means A has title. It is immaterial for what reason this state of affairs
has come about.
it What form the conveyance may take has been largely determined by
the courts but legislatures have required writings. Formerly courts per-
mitted various forms of conveyances to pass title for example, under cer-
tain circumstancer an exchange of tracts of land passed title to both.
BLAOKSTONE 323.
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acceptance will be discussed below. Delivery soon came to
have a technical legal meaning. 2 The importance of the
intent of the grantor to deliver the deed steadily grew, until
at present cases may be found from which it may be argued
that if the deed be properly executed and the intent of the
grantor to have it operate as a present conveyance be shown
nothing more is essential."3 In fact there is controversy
as to whether proof of intent to deliver without more is
sufficient, or whether some slight act or acts in addition on
the part of the grantor are still necessary to make a valid
delivery. 4 Certainly if there are words coupled with slight
acts consistent therewith the delivery may be held good.
The grantor need not part with the possession of the docu-
ment, and it is not necessary that the grantee be aware of
the delivery."
If delivery is the. final act which completes the con-
veyance, then it seems to follow that acceptance by the
grantee or by his agent is no longer essential. In England
that is certainly true, but the grantee has the privilege of
disclaiming when he discovers what has been done.'" In
this country the necessity of acceptance by the grantee is
strongly insisted upon in some jurisdictions," and if so,
then acceptance by the grantee must be the final thing which
12 "Signing and sealing a deed are insufficient to pass the interest to the
grantee without delivery. This does not mean mere physical delivery, but
a delivery accompanied by words or conduct signifying the grantor's in-
tention to be bound by the provisions of the deed." CHESunlE, REAL PsoP-
ERTY, 595.
is Roberts v. Security Co. Ltd., 1 Q. B. 11 (1897); Fryer t'. Fryer, 77
Neb. 298, 109 N. W. 175 (1906) ; Moore v. Hazelton, 91 Mass. 102 (1864).
14 "The question of delivery is one of intention, and the rule is that a
delivery is complete when there is an intention manifested on the part of the
grantor to make the instrument his deed." DEvLIN oN DEEDs, 3rd. ed. § 202.
15 In most cases where the question of delivery arises the court is seeking
to find whether this intention to deliver is present. Of course there
must be a proper deed duly executed. But though the court may be
speaking of acts of delivery, yet these acts are usually considered as bear-
ing on the intent of the grantor. Too frequently one may be misled by
the fact a deed has been handed over to the grantee. That merely signi-
fies intent. It raises a presumption of delivery for that is the usual mean-
ing of such act, but this presumption may be rebutted.
16 Thompson v. Leach, 2 Ventris 198 (1691); Mallott v. Wilson, 2 Ch.
494 (1903); Standing v. Bowring, L. R. 31 Ch. D. 282 (1885).
17 Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243 (1860); Hibbard v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547,
4 Pac. 473 (1885); Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 Wall. 81 (1866).
346
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completes the conveyance. It has been suggested that this
notion has been derived from the erroneous idea that a con-
veyance is a contract, instead of a mere device for trans-
ferring the grantor's title relation or title rights."8 Clearly
then the English view that acceptance is not essential to
the effectiveness of the conveyance is preferable, and it is
in accord with the law in the states which permit a delivery
of a deed to a grantee who is not aware of the conveyance.
Unfortunately the decisions even in such states are filled
with language which indicates that acceptance is essential.
But the cases which squarely raise the question are those
where the deed is made and delivered without the knowl-
edge of the grantee. Here the courts often say acceptance
will be presumed where the conveyance is beneficial to the
grantee, a statement which gives courts great latitude, but
which certainly permits delivery without acceptance by the
grantee. A presumption that the grantee will accept when
he learns the facts is not an acceptance, and obviously the
court cannot well presume the grantee has accepted before
he is aware of the conveyance. 9 There is much in Mr.
Tiffany's statement that the language of many courts indi-
cate acceptance is requisite, while the decisions hold that it
is not.20 Seemingly the courts do not clearly get the idea
that the conveyance is a grant to the title rights in land and
is not a contract between the grantor and grantee. It seems
so much a contract transaction that they are apt to assume
acceptance is essential.
Two common types of cases which present the question
as to the necessity of acceptance of a conveyance, are those
where the grantor gives the deed to a third person with
18 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2nd ed. 1792. That a conveyance is not a
contract see ANsoN, CONTRACTS, 13th ed. 3; WILLIsTON, CONTRATS, § 487.
i "If there is no acceptance, no rule of law, whether or not designated
a presumption, can create an acceptance. The only conclusion, it is sub-
mitted, to be drawn from the decisions upholding a beneficial conveyance
even in the absence of acceptance, is that acceptance is not necessary in
the case of such a conveyance. The adoption of the double fiction, that
acceptance is necessary, and that it exists though confessedly it does not
exist, has, it is conceived, no reason whatsoever of policy or convenience
in its favor." TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2nd ed. 1789-90.
20 'IFFANY, REAL PoaPEsTY, 2nd ed. 1788.
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directions to deliver it to the grantee after the grantor's
death, and the cases where the grantor executes and records
the deed as a present conveyance without the grantee's knowl-
edge. In the first class of cases the grantee frequently does
not learn of the existence of the deed until after the grantor's
death, hence if he must accept to effectuate the conveyance
his acceptance will come too late.2" A majority of the courts,
probably including our own, hold the conveyance valid,2
dodging the acceptance issue by saying acceptance will be
presumed. It may be presumed the grantee will accept when
he learns of the conveyance but it seems foolish to say it is
presu/med he has accepted, and this would be a necessary
assumption if acceptance is requisite. All these cases hold
acceptance is not required. In the latter class of cases even
where the grantor later tries to revoke and for this purpose
destroys the deed, the conveyance has been sustained though
the grantee meanwhile died without learning of its exist-
ence.2 But why should courts say acceptance will be pre-
sumed where the conveyance is beneficial to the grantee? 4
Why not permit the grantee to choose for himself whether he
desires the land, with attached conditions? The reason prob-
ably is that the courts adopted the idea in order to dodge
the acceptance issue in cases where it happened the deed
was purely one of gift.
There seem to be no cases in this state squarely holding
that acceptance by the grantee is essential to a conveyance,
21 Clark v. Creswell, 112 Md. 339, 76 Atl. 579 (1910); Munoz v.
Wilson, 111 N. Y. 295 (1888); Guggenheimer v. Lockridge, 39 W. Va. 457,
19 S. E. 874 (1894). To say acceptance is presumed here is to say no ac-
ceptance is necessary.
22Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 612, 30 S. E. 201 (1898); Lang v. Smith,
37 W. Va. 725, 737, 17 S. E. 213 (1893) (dictum) ; Davis v. Ellis, 39
W. Va. 226, 19 S. E. 399 (1894) (dictum).
25 Mitchell v. Ryan, 3 Oh. St. 377 (1854.) The same result is reached
where the grantee is non compos nentis or an infant. Turner v. Turner,
173 Cal. 782, 161 Pac. 980 (1916); Miller v. Meirs, 155 Ill. 284, 40 N. E.
577 (1895).
24 Certainly acceptance cannot be presumed to have taken place before
the grantee knows of the deed, and if it is presumed he will accept then
in case of delivery to a third party to be delivered over after death of the
grantor the acceptance will obviously be too late. Why continue to need-
lessly encumber our law with such fictions and inconsistencies?
348
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though there are dicta to that effect.2" However, in most
of these cases in which dicta are found the court was con-
sidering the matter from the standpoint of the grantee, and
recognizing his power of disclaimer," but in some of them
the court is evidently somewhat puzzled about the matter,
being aware of decisions holding the conveyance valid where
there had been no acceptance.2 It would improve the law
if all notions of the necessity of acceptance were eliminated.
Some fictions would disappear and this is always of ad-
vantage. The cases are liberal as to what constitutes a
valid delivery of a deed. It need not be handed over to any-
one for the benefit of the grantee but the grantor may re-
tain possession, so that the law on this point ought not be
clouded with uncertainty as to whether or not it must be
accepted. Greater clarity will be attained by getting away
from the notion that a conveyance of land is a contract, and
by keeping in mind that title to land is not a thing which
passes from hand to hand, but is a bundle of rights, powers,
privileges and immunities-the legal relation of the person
to specific land.
On the whole, however, our court deals with delivery of
deeds in a modern and enlightened manner, with the excep-
tion of one ancient doctrine which is still settled law.
It will be admitted the law ought to operate justly, though
26 Richardson v. Hardman, 97 W. Va. 573, 125 S. E. 442 (1924) ; Downs
v. Downs, 89 W. Va. 155, 108 S. E. 875 (1921); Lynch v. Brookover, 72
W. Va. 211, 77 S. E. 983 (1913); Reel v. Reel, 59 W. Va. 106, 54 S. E. 47
(1906); Guggenheimer v. Lockridge, 39 W. Va. 457, 19 S. E. 874 (1894);
Ferguson v. Bond, 39 W. Va. 561, 20 S. E. 591 (1894).
26 "On authority we may say that acceptance is not a part of delivery,
but that delivery makes the deed good against the grantor vesting the
estate in the grantee; but such delivery may be avoided by disclaimer or
disavowal of the deed by the grantee, and thereupon the delivery is avoided,
and the estate reverts to the grantor by remitter. . . .
"While acceptance is necessary it need not be expressed, as it may be
implied, and will be implied from many circumstances ......... The
language of the books is that acceptance of the deed is necessary to its
operation. Perhaps it would be better to say that dissent by the grantee
must he shown; for it is not stating the law too broadly to say, that in
all conveyances beneficial to the grantee the assent of the grantee is pre-
sumed until his dissent be shown . . ." Guggenheimer V. Lockridge, 39 W.
Va. 457, 461, 19 S. E. 874 (1894). The first paragraph of the above excerpt
is certainly supported by authority yet the court is evidently somewhat
puzzled by acceptance. But it is correct to say that acceptance of the deed
is not necessary but that dissent or disclaimer by the grantee may be made.
27 Guggenheimer v. Lockridge, 39 W. Va. 457, 461, 19 S. E. 874 (1894).
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being operated by human beings perfect justice will not be
attained. But justice ought not be prevented by a rule of
law with nothing to recommend it but hoary age. A recent
West Virginia case presents an interesting contrast with a
recent Virginia case. In the former 8 a testator de-
vised land to his youthful wife for life or until she married,
with remainder to Peter Rouss if living t the termination
of the life estate, provided Peter then pay $2000 to each of
six named legatees. The widow desired to remarry and
yet keep the life estate. She induced Peter to give her a
deed conveying her an estate for life in the land to take
effect when she secured from the six legatees a written agree-
ment to postpone payment of the money by Peter until her
death. This arrangement, if carried out, would make Peter's
remainder vested instead of contingent and would enable the
widow to have the life estate absolutely. Unknown to Peter
she filed a renunciation of her husband's will about two
weeks before Peter entrusted the deed to her hands. She
then married one of the six legatees, never secured the written
postponement of the payments she promised to get and left
Peter liable to pay $2000 to each of five persons, the sixth
one who married the widow having generously signed the
agreement. The widow thus got a husband, the very large
personal estate of her deceased husband, and a life estate in
the land including a fine residence. Peter got a present
liability to pay $10,000 and a vested remainder in land
following the death of a woman likely to outlive him. Peter
felt aggrieved and sued but was assured by the court that
he had no remedy either at law or in equity, even though
he had acted pursuant to a contract with the widow."9 One
28 Rouss v. Rouss, 90 W. Va. 646, HI S. E. 586 (1922).
29 It is true Peter expected to convert a remainder contingent on his
living until the life estate terminated into a vested remainder which would
take effect at the death of the widow. Perhaps the court thought this
unethical but if so it was not commented upon. If it could be termed
slightly unethical certainly the widow's conduct seems positively fraudulent.
It is interesting to note that where a deed has thus been delivered to
take effect on the happening of a condition, if the condition fails a court
of equity will not set aside the transaction, even where there was a contract
between the parties as was the case here. No fraud was proved at the time
the deed was, delivered, and the court said there was only failure of the
promise to get the writings which formed the consideration. Hence the
only way to get relief was to show the deed never took effect.
350
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would suspect the widow acted throughout under expert legal
advice. A layman might think Peter had been defrauded
but if so he was defrauded legally !" In the Virginia Case"
the defendant had entered into a sealed contract to sell a
farm and promissory notes were given to him by the com-
plainant for part of the purchase price. The sealed con-
tract was made and delivered on an oral agreement by the
defendant that it was to be effective only in case the Corpo-
ration Commission approved an increase in the capital
stock of a corporation, and that the defendant then sub-
scribed for a certain amount of such stock. Contrary to the
expectations of the parties the Corporation Commission re-
fused approval, so the stock could not be issued, but the
defendant later brought suit to collect one of the promissory
notes and a bill was filed to enjoin such collection. The
Virginia court admitted parol evidence that the contract
was delivered to take effect on a condition which had never
happened, and gave relief. The West Virginia court fol-
lowed a doctrine which has been established law since Whid-
don's Case"3 decided in 1596, and Williams v. Greet s3 de-
cided in 1602, but with nothing else to recommend it. The
Virginia court in an exhaustive and well reasoned opinion
laid the ghost of Whiddon's Case after three hundred and
twenty-five years and let us hope the ghost will never walk
in Virginia again. But in West Virginia the grip of the
doctrine seems immovably bedded in the legal fabric."
To an intelligent layman the rule that a delivery of a
deed to the grantee to take effect upon a condition is an
so That the widow had a preconceived fraudulent design was not proved.
The result however is just as bad as if she had. She certainly did act very
unethically before the end and one cannot help suspecting she had expert
legal advice and the whole thing was planned. If not she was very lucky
or very wise. It is so easy to say she really intended to get the legatees
to sign if possible but after getting the deed she was under the law per-
fectly free to keep the land without making an effort to get them to sign.
Many frauds are perpetrated in this way.
a1Whitaker v. Lane, 108 Va. 317, 104 S. E. 252 (1920).
32 Cro. Eliz. 520.
33 Cro. Eliz. 884.
34 See the line of cases collected in 34 W. VA. L. QuAn. 194. There are
a number of decisions all within the past twenty-five years. They very
clearly indicate this type of case arises frequently today and that a remedy
is needed.
9
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absolute delivery, and the condition is void, would seem un-
just. Though courts have repeatedly recognized its injustice
for many years few courts in this country have brushed it
aside, and it is not to the credit of our courts that these cases
are so few."
Here we have one of the best examples of the survival of
a primitive doctrine through the operation of the doctrine
of stare decisis, though no reasonable excuse for it has
existed for centuries, and probably none ever did exist. We
have persigting in our law a strange exception to the now
established doctrine that the intent of the grantor is the
controlling element in delivery of a deed, for here his intent
is disregarded and the contrary of his intent is rigidly en-
forced against him, and he is even denied relief in equity
The fact that a doctrine is old is no reason for discarding it,
for an ancient doctrine may now be supported by good and
valid modern reasons which justify its retention, though the
early reasons for its adoption no longer exist. Let us then
examine the ancient and the modern reasons given as bases
for this ancient rule.
Whiddon's Case merely stated that delivery of a deed can-
not be averred to be in the party himself as an escrow, with-
out stating why. Williams v. Green said it could not be
allowed for "a bare averment without any writing would
make every deed void". Coke says "for the delivery is suffi-
cient without speaking any words (otherwise a mute man
could not deliver a deed) and tradition only is requisite, and
then when the words are contrary to the act which is the
delivery, the words are of none effect." * * *.1 To Coke the
tradition is so significant that the words are of no effect and
presumably he would always disregard the words. This is
the descendent of the civil law notion heretofore mentioned
which came into the common law after the passage of the
95 Inman v. Quiery, 128 Ark. 605, 194 S. W. 858 (1917); Roundtree v.
Smith, 150 Ill. 493, 38 N. E. 680 (1894); Mitchell v. Clem, 295 Ill. 150,
128 N. E. 815 (1920) ; Elliott v. Mlurray, 225 1l. 107, 80 X. E. 77 (1906);
Haviland v. Haviland, 130 Ia. 611, 105 N. W. 354 (1905); Whitaker v.
Land, supra; Burnett v. Rhudy, 137 Va. 67, 119 S. E. 97 (1923); M Kin-
ney v. Buford, 81 Okl. 166, 197. Pac. 430 (1921).
as CoXn, Irr. 38a.
352
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Statute of Frauds, the notion being that the act of handing
over the paper passed title just as did the ceremony of
livery of seisen, and the act or ceremony could not be
rendered null merely by speaking words to the contrary.
This is the "primitive formalism" of which Wigmore
speaks 5 -- the original reason for the rule that a delivery
to the grantee on condition is an absolute delivery. This sort
of reasoning is no longer valid and to our courts, accustomed
as they are, to holding that the words accompanying the
delivery of a deed are most significant, and that little in
addition to words is essential to delivery of a deed, this old
reasoning is not understandable. Consequently they have
shown diligence in searching for more reasonable bases for
the doctrine, and after three centuries of such search if any
such reasons exist we may fairly presume they have been
found. Let us examine the reasons now given for the rule.
The reason most commonly given and the one which seems
most satisfying to the courts, judging from its popularity,
is that to admit evidence that the delivery was made to the
grantee on a condition which has not happened, would vio-
late the parol evidence rule, that is, would vary the terms of
a complete formal written instrument." A court never yet
has been able to point out any term of the instrument which
such evidence, if admitted, would vary. The instrument con-
tains nothing whatever about delivery. The grantee has
possession of a writing which in form is a deed, and a pre-
sumption of delivery arises because he is grantee and has
possession."9 The evidence if admitted. would merely rebut
this presumption and it certainly is a rebuttable presump-
tion. The delivery of a deed is always proved by evidence
extrinsic to the instrument unless such delivery depends on
S7 WxGeon, EVIDENCE, § 2405. "A conditional delivery to the grantee in
escrow, however, has come down to us traditionally as a complete act, the
condition being vain. But this is an arbitrary distinction; no reason and
no policy justifies it. In England, the older rule, as handed down in Coke's
treatises, has for more than two generations been repudiated". Id., § 2408.
88 See long discussion in Dorr v. Middleburg, 65 W. Va. 778, 65 S. E. 97
(1909). Nearly all the cases now base the doctrine on the parol evidence
rule.
a9 Ward v. Ward, 43 W. Va. 1, 26 S. R. 542 (1896); Newlin v. Beard,
6 W. Va. 110 (1873).
353
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a presumption which is not rebutted. In all other situations
where a question of delivery is involved, parol evidence can
be introduced, but here it cannot "because of the parol
evidence rule." In fact where the delivery of the deed to the
grantee on condition is not alleged in the pleadings and
the question arises at the trial, the court would first have
to admit parol evidence and then find from this evidence
that the delivery was to the grantee on condition, and then
strike out this very evidence because its admission violates
the parol evidence rule. In other words parol evidence is
admitted to prove that evidence not admissible. To carry
this out logically the court then, having struck out the evi-
dence, should not be able to find the deed was delivered on
condition, and the delivery therefore absolute. In a case in-
volving a deed in exactly the same form, the grantor could
prove by parol that he handed the deed to the grantee to
examine; that he handed it to the grantee believing it
would take effect only when recorded; or any other set of
facts showing that it was not handed to the grantee as his
deed, and in this manner he could rebut the presumption of
delivery arising from the grantee's possession."0 But he
cannot by parol prove that he handed it to the grantee to
take effect only if the grantor returned from a certain
journey; or when the grantee paid a sum of money; or
when the grantee secured and delivered to the grantor cer-
tain releases or on any other contingency. 1 The parol
evidence rule seems to be an excuse and not a reason.
Another reason sometimes given why a conditional de-
livery to the grantee is necessarily absolute, is that "Since
the grantee cannot act as agent of both himself and the
40 In Whitaker v. Lane, 128 Va. 317, 344-5 the court lists a lot in
analogous cases where parol evidence has been admitted.
41 The Virginia court has criticised the rule and in West Virginia are two
cases involving bonds which practically do away with it. See Newlin v.
Beard, 6 W. Va. 110 (1873), and Stuart v. Livesey, 4 W. Va. 45 (1870).
But in Dorr v. Middleburg, supra, the court was able to brush these deci-
sions aside. Seemingl& in some manner the conclusion has been reached
that the doctrine applies only to deeds of real estate and not to bonds,
notes and the like, though Whiddon's Case and Williams v. Green, involved
the latter type of instrument.
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grantor for the purpose of a second delivery title must neces-
sarily have passed by the first delivery". A delivery of a
deed is sometimes made to a third party to deliver to the
grantee if a certain event happens; the first delivery being
the one to the third party and the second delivery being
to the grantee after the condition has happened.2 In some
manner it is argued that this conditional delivery to the
grantee is a form of such a delivery in escrow so quite
triumphantly the court can point out that the man cannot
deliver to himself as agent for the grantor. Of course he
could be treated as agent of the grantor to deliver to him-
self. There is in fact no difficulty in so considering him, if
necessary, but why continue to similate this situation to a
delivery in escrow just because Whiddon's Case so treated
it three hundred and twenty-five years ago? It is not in-
tended to be a delivery in escrow, but is intended to be a
delivery to the grantee to take effect on the happening of
some condition and not otherwise."
This is the whole array of reasons for the above doctrine
which three centuries have produced. Judges have con-
demned the rule but followed it. In West Virginia it was
destroyed in cases similar to Whiddon's Case and Willians
v. Green, only to have the court discover that the rule only
applies to deeds of real estate, whereupon it again rises
triumphantly. Its vitality is astonishing. It is submitted
that this old doctrine ought to be eliminated, and the law
made more nearly to accord with justice and common sense.
A man ought not be so negligent as to deliver a deed to
the grantee to take effect on a condition, but experience has
shown that from time to time the layman will thus entrust
a document to the grantee, and if he does so, why have a
legal trap for him. The fact our Court of Appeals has
42 This is largely relied upon by the court in Dorr v. Middleburg. But
just why this must be similated to a delivery in escrow when plainly it is
not what is usually understood by that term, the writer has never been
able to understand, unless perhaps if a court once makes the assumption
then it properly follows it can give a reason for holding the deed absolute.
43 A court assumes a delivery in escrow is a delivery to some agent to he
delivered to the grantee on the happening of a condition.
13
Simonton: Transferring Title to Land by Deed
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1930
356 TRANSFERRING TITLE BY DEED
passed upon the question five times in less than twenty years
indicates such deliveries are not at all uncommon. If
evidence were admitted to show the delivery was on condi-
tion, it is quite easy to adequately protect the grantee. He
has the advantage that arises from possession of the deed
and all that is necessary is that the grantor be required to
prove the facts he relies upon by clear and convincing
evidence.
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